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The fact pattern is common enough. A person purchases a product
from a seller who is not the manufacturer, and after taking the product
home finds that the product does not work correctly. Sometimes the
malfunction is not manifested until several weeks or months after the
sale. Often, when the sales contract is read, the buyer discovers that it
contains either a disclaimer of all warranties or a limitation of the rem-
edies available for the included warranties. If the product is a car or
other expensive purchase, the buyer usually takes the product back to
the seller, or the seller comes to the buyer's premises to repair the de-
fects. Some defects, however, remain even after several repair attempts.
While the fact pattern may be straightforward, the legal road de-
lineating the rights and remedies of the buyer is twisted and, in some
ways, uncertain. This article first addresses the buyer's rights against
the actual seller. It then analyzes the rights the buyer has against the
manufacturer with whom the buyer is not in privity of contract.
The uncertainties in this area are often caused by judicial con-
struction of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 Much of this
construction occurred when courts were eliminating the concept of priv-
ity in warranty law in an effort to expand warranties to cover cases now
covered under products liability. Now that the law in products liability
is developed, it is time to reconstrue Article 2 and resolve the
uncertainties.
In all except a few jurisdictions," the buyer cannot sue either the
Janet A. Flaccus, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas; B.A. Wheaton Col-
lege, 1971; M.A. University of California, Davis, 1973; J.D. University of California, Davis, 1978;
L.L.M., University of Illinois, 1985.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code has been enacted in all states except Louisiana. Louisiana
has enacted Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 in substance. The Code has also been enacted in the
District of Columbia, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. Arkansas' version
of the Uniform Commercial Code is in Title 85 of the Arkansas Revised Statutes.
2. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), is as celebrated
as Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), in that it came down at the same
time and represents an opposite approach to the same problem. Santor allowed consumer purchas-
ers to sue the manufacturer with whom they had no privity for the cost of carpet in their house
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seller or the manufacturer in products liability in tort. We assume in
our fact pattern that the malfunctioning product has not injured person
or property, but that only "economic loss" is involved. Many jurisdic-
tions, following the California case of Seely v. White Motor Co.,$ hold
that products liability in tort is not an available cause of action where
only economic loss is involved.' Some jurisdictions, including Arkansas,
deviate somewhat from the Seely approach and, instead of focusing on
the type of loss involved, focus on whether the product was unreasona-
bly dangerous or has caused a calamitous event.' If neither is found,
these jurisdictions hold that strict liability is not available. This inter-
pretation also may exclude property damage from an action in strict
because the carpet had an unsightly run in it. The following jurisdictions follow the Santor rule:
Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Verdon v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 187 Conn. 363, 446 A.2d 3 (1982) (dicta); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich.
App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); lacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326
N.E.2d 267 (1975); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder and Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240
N.W.2d 124 (1976).
However, it should be noted that in at least New Jersey and Colorado, nonconsumer buyers
will not be able to sue in strict liability when the damage is only economic loss. Spring Motors
Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985), distinguished Santor while hold-
ing that a commercial buyer had no cause of action in tort for a defective transmission in a truck
it had purchased. Thus, the Santor exception to the general rule has been narrowed. Hiigel v.
General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975), in dicta also excluded business losses.
3. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
4. Corporate Air Fleet v. Gates Learjet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); Mid-
land Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus., 395 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Cooley v. Salopian Indus.,
383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974); Monsanto Agricultural Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (negligence action); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho
326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978); Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa
1972); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); Hagert v. Hatton
Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398
S.W.2d 240 (1966)(dicta); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572
S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977); Berg v.
General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976) (negligence action).
5. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Salt River Project Agricultural Im-
provement and Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (1984);
Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983); Vulcan
Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983) (negligence action); Moor-
man Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 II1. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Crowder v.
Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213
Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); John R. Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 App. Div.
2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383
(1978); Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester Co., 317 Pa. Super. 65, 463
A.2d 1085 (1983); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982). It
should be noted that there may not be unanimity here. Most of these courts use the calamitous
event exception to broaden the otherwise restrictive rule that economic loss is not recoverable in a
strict liability action. In Berkeley Pump Co., however, the requirement of proof of unreasonable
danger was used by the court to restrict the coverage of strict liability.
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liability when the product was not unreasonably dangerous. In Berke-
ley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co.,6 the defective product was an
irrigation pump that failed to pump sufficient water and injured the
buyer's crops.7 The damage to the crops was arguably property dam-
age, and under Seely, a strict liability action should have been availa-
ble.8 However, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the pump was
not unreasonably dangerous despite its malfunctioning, and the theory
of products liability could not be used by the buyer.9 For the most part,
when only economic loss is involved, the product will not be unreasona-
bly dangerous. Thus, the hypothetical buyer is relegated in most juris-
dictions, including Arkansas, to contract relief governed by Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
II. Buyers Remedies Against the Seller
A. In General
Article 2 contains numerous remedies for a buyer. In general, once
defective goods are received, the buyer can either return the product
and sue for damages, or keep the product and sue for damages. To
return the product the buyer must either reject the product under sec-
tion 2-601 or revoke his or her acceptance of the product under section
2-608.10 It is clear that unlike prior law, which required an election
between rescission and damages, a decision to reject or revoke accept-
ance of a product does not preclude the buyer from seeking damages."'
Several sections delineate the buyer's damage rights under Article
2. Section 2-711 catalogues remedies available for the aggrieved buyer
in cases in which he or she never received the goods, properly rejected
them, or justifiably revoked acceptance of them. 2 For example, the
buyer can buy the product elsewhere and sue for the difference in the
6. 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).
7. Id. at 385-86, 653 S.W.2d at 129-30.
8. It can be argued that the damage to the crops in Berkeley Pump was mere consequential
economic loss, such as when the defendant damages a machine and causes it to produce fewer
widgets and thus generate less profit.
9. Berkeley Pump Co., 279 Ark. at 390-94, 653 S.W.2d at 131-33.
10. U.C.C. §§ 2-601, 2-608 (1978). It should be noted that rejection of installment contracts
is covered by a different rule in § 2-612.
11. Section 2-720 states that any "cancellation" or "rescission" of the contract will not be
construed as precluding the aggrieved party from suing for breach. Section 2-711 reinforces this
by stating that a buyer may cancel the contract and still recover damages for breach. Section 2-
608 official comment 1 (1978) makes it clear that the term "revocation of acceptance" was chosen
to avoid any of the prior rules concerning rescission as an election of a remedy.
12. U.C.C. § 2-711 (1978).
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price between the cover price and contract price under section 2-712.11
If the buyer has not purchased the product elsewhere, he or she can sue
to collect the difference between the market price of the product and
the contract price under section 2-713.1' In addition, the buyer may be
entitled to incidental and consequential damages under section 2-715.11
In contrast, if the buyer decides to keep the goods, available damages
are outlined in section 2-714.18
B. The Impact of Disclaimer Under Section 2-316 or the Limitation
of Remedy Under Section 2-719.
Recall that in the hypothetical fact pattern, the sales contract con-
tained either a disclaimer of all warranties or a limitation of the availa-
ble remedies under the warranty. The two are quite different and
should not be confused. 17 A warranty disclaimer must comply with the
requirements of section 2-316. For example, the disclaimer of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability must mention merchantability and
be conspicuous if the disclaimer is in writing, and the disclaimer of the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must be in writing
and be conspicuous.18 If an express warranty has been created, a con-
13. U.C.C. § 2-712 (1978) delineates the damages recoverable when the buyer has covered.
14. U.C.C. § 2-713 (1978) delineates the damages recoverable when the buyer does not
cover.
15. U.C.C. § 2-715 (1978).
16. U.C.C. § 2-714 (1978) specifies the damages recoverable when the buyer accepts the
goods and does not revoke his or her acceptance. The buyer retains possession of the defective
goods. Section 2-714 should not be confused with the buyer's damage rights for defective goods
returned to the seller. Yet this is arguably what the Arkansas Supreme Court did in Ozark Ken-
worth, Inc. v. Neidecker, 283 Ark. 196, 672 S.W.2d 899 (1984). In this case the purchaser of a
truck used the truck for approximately five months after revoking his acceptance of it. The pri-
mary issue before the court was whether this use precluded the buyer from revoking his accept-
ance of the truck, and the court held that it did not. The court remanded the case, however,
because the buyer had failed to adequately prove his damages. The court stated that the appropri-
ate section for measuring damages is § 2-714. However, § 2-714 is only applicable for measuring
damages for buyers who keep the goods. It is not applicable for measuring damages when the
buyer revokes his or her acceptance of the goods. If § 2-714 is used to measure damages then the
buyer will not be properly compensated. Section 1-106 makes it clear that the remedy provisions
of the Code are designed to place the aggrieved party in as good a position as they would have
been had the other party fully performed. Once a buyer rejects or revokes acceptance of goods, he
or she must be given a return of any part of the price paid, cover damages under § 2-712 or
market price damages under § 2-713, and any incidental and/or consequential damages under §
2-715.
17. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) official comment 2 (1978) states: "[t]his Article treats the limitation
or avoidance of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate from
the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no warranty exists, there is of course no
problem of limiting remedies for breach of warranty."
18. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978).
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tractual provision disclaiming all express warranties will not be given
effect unless the two can be construed consistently.19 In contrast, a lim-
itation of remedies also must comply with the requirements of Article
2, but the requirements are different. The limitation of remedies is gov-
erned by section 2-719.20 If the contract has properly excluded all war-
ranties, however, then such limitations on the warranty are irrelevant.21
Although many cases focus on whether or not a warranty has been
properly disclaimed, such is not the focus here. For the purpose of the
hypothetical it is assumed that the contractual disclaimer of all war-
ranties complied with all of the requirements of section 2-316. The
same will be assumed with respect to a contractual provision limiting
the buyer's available remedies in the event of a breach.
It is important to understand the relationship of these two Code
provisions because contracts often have language covering both. If
there is no warranty liability because all warranties have been properly
disclaimed under section 2-316, a failure of the contract to comply with
the requirements of section 2-719 in the language limiting any remedy
does not create liability where none exists.22 Similarly, a failure to
properly disclaim warranty liability does not affect an otherwise proper
limitation of remedy.28 Thus, the questions of disclaimer of warranties
and limitation of remedies are different, but both limit the buyer's
rights under the contract.
What rights does the buyer have when a product malfunctions and
the contract properly disclaims all implied warranties? The answer
seems straightforward. In the hypothetical the seller has delivered, so
19. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1978).
20. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978).
21. U.C.C. § 2-316 official comment 2 (1978).
22. U.C.C. § 2-316 official comment 2 (1978) states:
2. The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral warranties
by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized representa-
tions by the customary "lack of authority" clauses. This Article treats the limitation or
avoidance of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, sepa-
rate from the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no warranty exists,
there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for breach of warranty. Under sub-
section (4) the question of limitation of remedy is governed by the sections referred to
rather than by this section.
23. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (1978) states that remedies for breach of warranty can be limited by
complying with § 2-719. Comment 2 to § 2-316, quoted in note 22 above, also makes it clear that
disclaimer of warranties and limitation of remedies are independent of one another. Comment 3 to
§ 2-719, in discussing unconscionable consequential damage limitations, notes that "such terms
are merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable risks. The seller in all cases is free to
disclaim all warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316." See also I. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-8 (2d ed. 1980).
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the question is whether the buyer can reject the malfunctioning product
or revoke his or her acceptance of it. Rightful rejection is covered by
section 2-601 and justifiable revocation of acceptance is covered by sec-
tion 2-608. Both sections require, however, a showing that the breach-
ing party has failed to perform at least one of its contractual obliga-
tions. Section 2-608 uses the word "non-conformity. ' 24 Section 2-601
uses the phrase "if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any re-
spect to conform to the contract." 5 Both tests are the same, however,
because section 2-106(2) defines "conforming" as goods or any part of
performance that "are in accordance with the obligations under the
contract."2  The New York Law Revisions Commission noted that
"[tlhe definition in subsection (2) of 'conforming' goods or conduct is
self evident. 21 Courts, however, have not found it so clear.
It follows from the definition of "conforming" in section 2-106(2)
that the parties' contract must be examined to determine whether the
seller has failed to comply with his or her obligations under the con-
tract. Recall that, in the hypothetical, all warranties have been prop-
erly disclaimed. Recall also that, in the hypothetical, the alleged breach
by the seller was the selling of a malfunctioning product. There are
numerous duties of a seller in any given contract. When the product
malfunctions, however, this is a breach of one of the warranty obliga-
tions in the contract, not a breach of one of the other obligations. If the
seller has properly disclaimed all implied warranties, then the selling of
a malfunctioning product does not breach the contract unless there is
an express warranty as to quality. A contract that properly disclaims
implied warranties is the same as a contract that sells the product "as
is." Using the phrase "as is" is merely one way of disclaiming implied
24. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1978) states: "(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or
commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
25. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1978) states:
Subject to the provision of this Article on breach in installment contracts (Section
2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of
remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
26. U.C.C. § 2-106(2) (1978).
27. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
363 (1955).
28. Seekings v. Jimmy GMC, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981); O'Neal Ford, Inc. v.
Earley, 13 Ark. App. 189, 681 S.W.2d 414 (1985); Blankenship v. Northtown Ford, Inc., 95 I1.
App. 3d 303, 420 N.E.2d 167 (1981).
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warranties. 9 There is no implied promise by the seller that the product
will function properly. Therefore, there is no nonconformity and the
buyer has no right to reject or revoke acceptance of the product. As the
court noted in Konicki v. Salvaco, Inc.,30 "[aJbsent any warranty...
there is nothing to which the goods must conform, ergo there can be no
non-conformity. Consequently, the buyer could not revoke acceptance
as against the seller."3 1
Some courts have ignored this, however. In Blankenship v. North-
town Ford, Inc.,3 2 the court held that, even in the event of a valid dis-
claimer of warranties, the buyer could revoke his acceptance of a car
that was not functioning correctly.83 The problems with the car were in
the drive shaft, U joints, and differential, and the malfunction of the
drive shaft necessitated repairs on many occasions.34 The court focused
on the word "non-conformity" in section 2-608 and reasoned that this
meant more than warranty obligations." Nonconformity is a failure of
the goods or conduct to comply with a party's obligations under the
contract.36 However, the nonconformity in Blankenship was a malfunc-
tioning car. This was a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.3 7 As the court noted, the car would not pass without
objection in the trade,38 which is one of the tests for the purpose of
establishing a breach of a warranty of merchantability.39 But, as the
court noted early in the opinion, it was going to assume that the war-
ranty disclaimer was effective. This would have meant that the seller-
dealer had no warranty obligations under the contract. Thus, the mal-
functioning car did not represent a contract breach and there was no
nonconformity.
However, the court in Blankenship concluded that "[ifn this case,
the evidence unequivocally demonstrated that the substantially defec-
29. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (1978).
30. 16 Ohio App. 3d 40, 474 N.E.2d 347 (1984) (italics in original).
31. Id. at 45, 474 N.E.2d at 352; see also Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522
F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981), a~fd, 681 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982); Crume v. Ford Motor Co., 60
Or. App. 224, 653 P.2d 564 (1982).
32. 95 III. App. 3d 303, 420 N.E.2d 167 (1981).
33. Id. The plaintiff's attorney stipulated that the warranty disclaimer complied with § 2-
316. At least one judge concurred, however, because he found that the disclaimer was not
conspicuous.
34. Id. at 304, 420 N.E.2d at 168-69.
35. Id. at 305-06, 420 N.E.2d at 170-71.
36. U.C.C. § 2-106(2) (1978).
37. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978).
38. 95 111. App. 3d at 305-06, 420 N.E.2d at 170-71.
39. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (1978).
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tive nature of the vehicle clearly impaired its value to the plaintiffs and
thus revocation of acceptance is appropriate even if the dealer has
properly disclaimed all implied warranties."'40 While it is true that the
seller has more than warranty obligations under a contract, the sale of
a defective car is a warranty breach, not a breach of another obliga-
tion. If the disclaimer of warranties was effective under section 2-316
then the court's conclusion was incorrect.
The court in Blankenship also used a slightly different line of rea-
soning to justify its decision."' It relied on an official comment to sec-
tion 2-313, the section that covers express warranties.42 Section 2-
316(1) recognizes that a disclaimer of all warranties does not disclaim
an express warranty included in the contract.4 3 An inclusion of both a
disclaimer and an express warranty would create ambiguity, and sec-
tion 2-316(1) renders such a warranty disclaimer inoperative with re-
spect to the express warranty unless the two can be construed consist-
ently.44 The court in Blankenship noted that a car without an engine
would breach the seller's express obligation to sell a new car, reasoning
that a metal box without an engine is not a car.45 The court's logic
falters, however, when the court reasons that a malfunctioning motor
breaches the express obligation to sell a new car. It is recognized that a
car with drive shaft, U joint, and differential problems is more like a
car with no engine than a car with merely a door problem. But, what
the car salesman expressly warranted was a sale of a new car. As long
as the car was not preowned, the agreement to sell a new car has not
been breached. The real issue in Blankenship was whether a car with a
malfunctioning drive shaft was a car. A metal box with no engine at all
would not be a car, but even a malfunctioning drive shaft or transmis-
sion does not render the car a noncar. Otherwise, to hold that a mal-
functioning engine turns a car into a noncar effectively eliminates the
seller's ability to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability by
40. 95 11. App. 3d at 306-07, 420 N.E.2d at 170.
41. Id. at 307, 420 N.E.2d at 171.
42. U.C.C. § 2-313 official comment 4 (1978) states:
4. In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to deter-
mine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of
those cases which refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material dele-
tion of the seller's obligation. Thus, a contract is normally a contract for a sale of
something describable and described. A clause generally disclaiming "all warranties,
express or implied" cannot reduce the seller's obligation with respect to such description
and therefore cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316.
43. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1978).
44. Id.
45. 95 II!. App. 3d at 307, 420 N.E.2d at 171.
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1986-87] COMMERCIAL CODE CONSTRUCTION
turning the implied warranty of merchantability into an express war-
ranty. The parties could have done this if the seller had agreed to de-
liver a car that functioned perfectly. This was not part of the parties'
contract in Blankenship, the court effectively wrote the obligation into
the contract.
The Blankenship decision, or at least its reasoning, has been fol-
lowed in Arkansas and Arizona.4 The Arizona Supreme Court in
Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc.,47 reached a similar result, on
similar facts, with similar reasoning."8 The defective product was a mo-
tor home with a malfunctioning engine, as in Blankenship. The defects
this time were in the gas gauge, power generator, furnace, and air con-
ditioner.4 9 In addition, the door was unsatisfactory. 0 The dealer-seller
had disclaimed all implied warranties pursuant to section 2-316, and
the only express warranty was a five-year power train warranty.51 As
did the court in Blankenship, the Arizona court noted that, the term
"non-conformity" of section 2-608 is not limited to breaches of warran-
ties.52 The court in Seekings stressed that the dealer had agreed to sell
46. Seekings v. Jimmy GMC, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981); O'Neal Ford, Inc. v.
Earley, 13 Ark. App. 189, 681 S.W.2d 414 (1985).
47. 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 599, 638 P.2d at 213.
50. Id.
51. Unlike the court in Blankenship, which intimated that it would not be bound by the
parties' stipulation that the disclaimer was valid, the Seekings court held that the disclaimer was
valid. 130 Ariz. at 602, 638 P.2d at 216. The result in the Seekings case can be justified on a
separate ground not discussed in the opinion. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act an entity that makes
a written warranty, as defined in the Act, is prohibited from disclaiming any implied warranties
arising under state law. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1982). Written warranties are defined as:
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the
sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the
material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is
defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time,
or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a con-
sumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to
such product set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or under-
taking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for
purposes other than the resale of such product.
15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1982). In Seekings the dealer had, for additional considerations, given a war-
ranty on the power train. 130 Ariz. at 599, 638 P.2d at 213. Since this was given for additional
consideration it may not have been a basis of the sale bargain. 16 C.F.R. § 700.11 (b) (1986). But
this is not significant, since it would be a service contract defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(8)(1982).
Both the suppliers of written warranties and suppliers of service contracts are precluded from
disclaiming implied warranties. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a). Therefore, the attempt by the dealer to
disclaim all implied warranties was ineffective under Magnuson-Moss.
52. 130 Ariz. at 602, 638 P.2d at 216.
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a new car." Therefore, the court reasoned, the dealer had impliedly
represented that the vehicle, "after a reasonable time for authorized
warranty repair work to cure any defects, would be 'mechanically new
and factory furnished, operate perfectly, and be free of substantial
defects.' "5'
It seems at first blush that the seller in Seekings had agreed to
provide more than the seller had provided in Blankenship, since a con-
tractual obligation to provide, in a short period of time, a car free of
defects would clearly have been breached under the facts in Seekings.
A closer examination of the opinion, however, reveals that the seller did
not promise this. As the court noted, it implied this obligation into the
parties' agreement.55 The parties had not expressly agreed to such a
warranty, and all implied warranties had been disclaimed. Thus, the
question is where does the court in Seekings acquire the power to imply
such an obligation? The only place the Code implies such an obligation
is in the implied warranty of merchantability, however, this had been
properly disclaimed. The court in Seekings merely relied on prior cases
for this implied obligation." The problem, however, is that the cases
relied on by the court are factually dissimilar to the facts in Seekings.
In none of the three cases were the implied quality warranties entirely
disclaimed, as in Seekings.5 7 All had an express warranty of quality
with a remedy limited to repair and/or replacement of defective
parts.58 The language quoted by the court in Seekings to create the
implied obligation was used by the other courts to indicate that after
many unsuccessful repair attempts by the seller, the remedy failed of
its essential purpose." None of these decisions hold, or even suggest,
that when all warranties are validly disclaimed the seller still warrants
53. Id. at 602-03, 638 P.2d at 216-17.
54. Id. at 603, 638 P.2d at 217.
55. Id. at 602, 638 P.2d at 216.
56. Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (1972); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super.
441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513
(1978).
57. Orange Motors, Inc., 258 So. 2d at 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 263 So.
2d 831 (1972). Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc., 99 N.J. Super. at 445, 240 A.2d at 198 (1968); Mur-
ray, 83 Wis. 2d at 414, 265 N.W.2d at 518-19 (1978).
58. 258 So. 2d at 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (1972); 99
N.J. Super. at 445, 240 A.2d at 198 (1968); 83 Wis. 2d at 414, 265 N.W.2d at 518-19 (1978).
59. 258 So. 2d at 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (1972); 99
N.J. Super. at 445, 240 A.2d at 198 (1968); 83 Wis. 2d at 414, 265 N.W.2d at 518-19 (1978).
The Murray and Orange Motors cases involved revocation of acceptance when the repair and




that the car will "operate perfectly and be free of substantial de-
fects."60 Thus, the court in Seekings, as did the court in Blankenship,
used the sale of a new car to write into the parties' agreement a war-
ranty as to workmanship while ignoring an explicit contractual provi-
sion disclaiming all implied warranties.61
This same misconstruction of the word "non-conformity" as used
in section 2-608 can be seen in an Arkansas limitation of remedy case,
O'Neal Ford v. Earley.62 In O'Neal, unlike Blankenship and Seekings,
the seller did not attempt to disclaim all quality warranties covering
the used Granada it sold.68 Instead, it provided an express warranty but
limited the buyer's remedies to repair, and obligated the buyer to pay
one-half of the cost of any needed repairs." The buyer noticed strange
noises shortly after purchasing the car. Upon returning it to the dealer-
ship, the seller produced a list of needed repairs that it agreed to make
as long as the buyer paid one-half of the labor and parts." Dissatisfied
with this proposal, the buyer attempted to revoke her acceptance of the
car." The court in O'Neal allowed plaintiff to revoke by concluding
that:
[T]he guarantee may have limited the [buyer's] . . . other warranties
provided for by the Uniform Commercial Code, or remedies therein
for the breach of such warranties, but in no way can [sic] be con-
strued to have foreclosed her right to revoke her acceptance within a
reasonable time of discovery of a nonconformity in the automobile."
As in Blankenship and Seekings, the only defect was a malfunc-
tion in the car. In these two cases, the contract disclaimed implied war-
ranties. In O'Neal the malfunction did place some obligations on the
seller, but section 2-719 allows sellers to limit the buyer's remedies
flowing from contract breaches." It is on the basis of section 2-719 that
most buyers win. For example, section 2-719(1) requires that any limi-
60. 258 So. 2d at 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (1972); 99
N.J. Super. at 445, 240 A.2d at 198 (1968); 83 Wis. 2d at 414, 265 N.W.2d at 518-19 (1978).
61. Seeking v. Jimmy GMC, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981).
62. 13 Ark. App. 189, 681 S.W.2d 414 (1985).
63. Id. at 190, 681 S.W.2d at 415.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 190-91, 681 S.W.2d at 415.
67. Id. at 192-93, 681 S.W.2d at 416.
68. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978) states: "(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for in-
jury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not."
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tation or remedy expressly be made exclusive, 6' a requirement the Ar-
kansas courts have strictly required.7 0 If the limited remedy is not ex-
pressly made the exclusive remedy, then the Code provides that the
buyer can resort to any of the remedies provided in the Code.7 There
was no indication in O'Neal, however, that the used car dealer's limited
remedy was not expressly made exclusive or otherwise failed to comply
with section 2-719.
In most litigated limited remedy cases, the buyer brings the car
back to the dealer several times, and the dealer is unable to fix the
problems. Under these facts many courts hold that the exclusive repair
and parts replacement remedy has failed of its essential purpose,7 as
provided for in section 2-719(2).73 Once again, when an exclusive rem-
edy fails of its essential purpose, the buyer has the choice of all of the
remedies provided in the Code.7 4 The plaintiff in O'Neal, however,
could not use this approach to extricate herself from such a bad bar-
gain, because she gave the dealer no opportunity to repair the car's
defects.75
The court in ONeal quoted from the Blankenship opinion and
concluded that, despite the contractual provision limiting the buyer's
remedies, section 2-608 and the buyer's right to revoke acceptance were
not affected. 7' There is nothing in the Code, however, to support this
conclusion. When a particular remedy is made expressly exclusive, all
other remedies, including rejection and revocation of acceptance, be-
come unavailable to the buyer because the Code has given the seller
the right to contractually limit the buyer's remedies under section 2-
719.77 The rights to reject or revoke acceptance are no different from
69. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (1978).
70. Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80 (1971) held that a limitation of
remedy stating, "the warranties herein are expressly IN LIEU OF any other ... warranty...
and of any other obligation on the part of the . . . dealer" did not exclusively limit the remedy to
the one stated and thus any remedy under the Code was available to the buyer. Id. at 180, 465
S.W.2d at 82.
71. U.C.C. § 2-719(i)(b) (1978).
72. S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Polycon Indus.,
v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County
Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (1972);
Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); Murray v. Holiday Rambler,
Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
73. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
74. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) official comment 1 (1978).
75. 13 Ark. App. 189, 681 S.W.2d 414 (1985).
76. Id. at 193, 681 S.W.2d at 416-17.
77. U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(a)-(b) (1978). Moreover, it is clear that rejection and revocation of
acceptance remedies are included in the limitation of remedies provisions in § 2-719. Section 2-
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other remedies. If there is no breach of warranty, or the remedies flow-
ing from a breach are limited, the buyer cannot revoke acceptance of
the goods.
If the dealer has contractually agreed to provide repairs under the
manufacturer's warranty there is hope for the buyer in the disclaimer
of warranty situation. This repair obligation must be part of the con-
tract to sell the car, otherwise, it will be a services contract and, there-
fore, not covered by the Code.7 8 If the dealer is contractually obligated
to repair the product, but fails to fix the problems, then the dealer has
breached one of its contractual duties. This breach is a "non-conform-
ity" pursuant to section 2-608(1)/7 There are, of course, other ele-
ments that need to be proven to be entitled to revoke acceptance under
section 2-608, 80 but once these are met, the nonconformity allows the
revocation of the buyer's acceptance of the goods.
The main problem with this approach is that there must be a con-
tractual agreement to provide repair that binds the seller. The Eighth
608(3) states that when the buyer has revoked his or her acceptance of a good, he or she has the
"same rights and duties with regard to the goods as if he had rejected them." Section 2-601 covers
the right to reject in noninstallment contracts. The right to reject the goods under § 2-601 is
expressly limited by any contractual limitation of remedy under § 2-719. Section 2-601 states:
"Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts. . . and unless other-
wise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719)
... " Thus, Code language makes it clear that a proper limitation of a buyer's remedies limits
rejection and revocation remedies as well as damage remedies.
78. U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-105(2) (1978). However, as discussed in note 51, supra, such a ser-
vice contract precludes the disclaimer of state created implied warranties under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act. Such a service contract must be in writing, however, to qualify as a service
contract under Magnuson-Moss. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(8) (1982).
79. U.C.C. §§ 2-608(1), 2-106(2) (1978).
80. Section 2-608 requires several elements before a buyer is entitled to revoke his or her
acceptance of the product. First, there must be a nonconformity. Second, the nonconformity must
substantially impair the product's value to the buyer. Third, the buyer must have accepted the
product either on the reasonable assumption that the seller would cure the nonconformity, or
without discovering the nonconformity because of the difficulty of discovery or the seller's assur-
ances. Fourth, the revocation must occur within a reasonable time after acceptance, and notice of
revocation must be given to the seller. Finally, revocation must be made before there is any sub-
stantial change in the condition of the goods not caused by the defect itself. The only requirement
that creates many problems for the buyer with an unrepaired product is the reasonable time re-
quirement. But many courts hold that as long as the seller is trying to repair the product the
buyer can reasonably wait to see if the repair can be made. Seekings v. Jimmy GMC, Inc., 130
Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981); Irrigation Motor & Pump Co. v. Belcher, 29 Colo. App. 343, 483
P.2d 980 (1971); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
Considerable time can elapse. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982) (a
delay of seventeen months); Irrigation Motor & Pump Co. v. Belcher, 29 Colo. App. 343, 483
P.2d 980 (1971) (a delay of six months); Sarnecki v. Al Johns Pontiac, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1121 (Pa. Ct. C. P. 1966) (a delay of five months; 3,000 miles had been put on the
car).
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Circuit in Ford Motor Credit v. Harper1 used this rationale, but it is
unclear whether in that case there was, in fact, such a contractual obli-
gation to repair. The court only stated that the parties had an express
understanding that Tri-County Ford Tractor Sales, the seller, would
provide efficient and competent repairs on the tractor.82 The court does
not discuss whether this understanding was in writing and, if not,
whether the various parol evidence rule requirements had been met.8 3
Only then is there a nonconformity and therefore a breach.84
This approach would not have helped the buyer in O'Neal because
she never allowed the seller to repair the car. Also, it will not help a
plaintiff whose seller has failed to repair the product if the seller is not
bound under the sales contract to repair the product. Thus, unless there
is a contractual obligation to repair, a buyer has no remedy against a
seller that has properly disclaimed warranties.
The buyer would not be in this dilemma if the seller had not val-
idly disclaimed all warranty obligations. Unfortunately, this seems to
be a rather routine practice in the new car industry. In the typical pat-
tern, the seller disclaims all warranties and the manufacturer provides
an express limited warranty. From the buyer's perspective, this is not
an "as is" purchase since the manufacturer's warranty obligations are
so prominently displayed. Yet, unless there is an express repair obliga-
tion binding the seller8 5 or an express written warranty,86 the buyer has
no remedy rights against the seller. This usually is not a disaster for
81. 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982).
82. Id. at 1124.
83. Id. at 1117.
84. The facts of the Harper case are not exactly like those in Blankenship, Seekings and
O'Neal. Although Tri-County had tried to disclaim all warranties, the court held that the dis-
claimer was not conspicuous. Harper, 671 F.2d at 1122-23 n.7. It therefore did not comply with §
2-316 and was not valid. The court went on to discuss whether there was a breach by the seller
other than a warranty breach. The-manufacturer argued that the tractor defects were not a manu-
facturing defect but were caused by Tri-County's poor repair job. Id. at 1122-23. Therefore, the
Eighth Circuit examined whether there was a contract breach other than a warranty breach. Tri-
County tried for 17 months to repair the tractor. Id. at 1124. The court stressed that the farmer
had bought the tractor from Tri-County because repairs would be quick and dependable there.
After noting the fact that the term "non-conformity" as used in § 2-608 includes more than
warranty obligations, the court held that Tri-County had breached the agreement because it had
failed to repair the tractor. Therefore, according to the court, there was a nonconformity and the
farmer could revoke his acceptance of the tractor.
85. The express repair obligation may create a nonconformity under the Code and may be a
service contract under Magnuson-Moss. See Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 324
S.E.2d 462 (1985).
86. The written warranty, if a written warranty under 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1982) of the




the buyer, as long as he or she has a remedy against the manufacturer.
After all, it is the manufacturer that provided a limited warranty guar-
anteeing the car to be free of defects for a limited period of time. How-
ever, this road to recovery also has its uncertainties.
III. The Buyer's Remedies Against the Manufacturer-Nonseller
A. Express Warranties
In many retail purchases the buyer is not buying from the manu-
facturer and there is no privity of contract between the seller and the
manufacturer. This privity requirement in contracts was a major reason
for the development of products liability in tort.8 7 If the loss is only
economic loss through a nondangerous malfunction, strict liability in
tort is not an available cause of action in most jurisdictions." If the
seller has validly disclaimed all warranties and has no contractual re-
pair obligation, does this leave the buyer with no remedy?
Most courts say no. As long as the manufacturer has given an
express warranty, most courts allow the manufacturer to be sued for
the breach of that express warranty despite the lack of privity.8 9 In
many of these jurisdictions, this decision is often made without Code
guidance. The section in the Code dealing with privity is section 2-
318. 90 It contains three alternatives from which states can choose. Al-
ternative A of section 2-318 does not address the question of vertical
privity and deals only with horizontal privity, which allows members of
the buyer's household and family and house guests to sue. 1 Vertical
87. Becker v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 794, 125 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1975).
88. See supra notes 1-5.
89. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965); Connolly v. Hagi, 24
Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d
1349 (1984); Scheuler v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 1 Kan. App. 2d 525, 571 P.2d 48 (1977);
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 309 Minn. 106, 244 N.W.2d 105 (1976); Whitaker v. Farm-
land, Inc., 173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977); Peterson v. North Am. Plant Breeders, 218 Neb.
258, 354 N.W.2d 625 (1984); Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 302 N.W.2d 655
(1981); Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985); Randy
Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962); Kinlaw v. Long
Mfg., 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,
218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); In-
dust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.1 (Supp.
1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
90. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978).
91. U.C.C. § 2-318 alternative A (1978) states:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is
in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
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privity is the interrelationship among the parties in the distributive
chain. Horizontal privity, on the other hand, concerns people outside
the distributive chain who have been affected by the product. Most ju-
risdictions have adopted alternative A to section 2-318. 91 Despite the
silence of alternative A as to vertical privity, comment 3 to section 2-
318 points out that alternative A should not be construed as a limita-
tion on the abolition of vertical privity.9 3 A number of states have ex-
pressly abolished vertical privity, at least for express warranties. 4
Alternative B to section 2-318 covers more beneficiaries and could
be construed to cover vertical privity.9 However, it is of no help in the
economic loss case since it is limited to personal injury.90 Once personal
injury is involved, most plaintiffs have a cause of action in strict liabil-
ity, and strict liability has no privity requirement.
Alternative C to section 2-318 covers the most beneficiaries and
can be construed to abolish vertical as well as horizontal privity for any
person who is injured by breach of an express or implied warranty. A
good argument can be made that mere economic loss is an injury due
to a warranty breach. However, when alternatives B and C were added
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
92. Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, the Virgin Islands, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
have adopted alternative A or a similar provision.
93. U.C.C. § 2-318 official comment 3 (1978) states: "the section in this form is neutral and
is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties,
given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain."
94. Connecticut, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, and Washington have
adopted alternative A to § 2-318, and they have expressly abolished privity with respect to express
warranties.
95. U.C.C. § 2-318 alternative B (1978) or a similar provision has been adopted by Ala-
bama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New York, North Carolina and Vermont. It states: "A seller's
warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be ex-
pected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
96. U.C.C. § 2-318 alternative B (1978).
97. U.C.C. § 2-318 alternative C (1978) or a similar provision has been more popular. The
following sixteen states have adopted alternative C or a similar provision: Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. Texas and California have
omitted the question of privity. Alternative C states:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may rea-
sonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section




to the official version of the Code, the Permanent Editorial Board's ex-
planation for the proposed changes in section 2-218 stated that alterna-
tive C was modeled after section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,98 which is limited to personal injury and property damage."
This seems to indicate that the drafters of alternative C did not intend
that it cover mere economic loss. But, most courts allowing a plaintiff
to sue a nonprivity manufacturer for breach of express warranty do not
base their decisions on section 2-318, and this possible ambiguity is not
addressed.
The most common rationale used by courts abolishing the privity
requirement in express warranty cases was discussed in detail by the
New York Court of Appeals in Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cy-
anamid Co.100 Noting that the world of merchandising no longer in-
volved direct contact, the court stressed the use of advertising tech-
niques and labels in which manufacturers proclaimed the qualities of
their product. 10 1 The court reasoned that since the manufacturers in-
tended the buyer to rely on these representations, the manufacturer
could not hide behind the doctrine of privity when the representations
proved to be false. 0 2 The representations in Randy Knitwear were on
labels and in advertising. 08
The rationale of the court in Randy Knitwear is even more persua-
sive in the car warranty situation in which the car is expressly war-
ranted for a particular period of time. It cannot be doubted that the car
manufacturers intend that the ultimate buyer rely on these warranties.
Therefore, the reasons for abolishing privity in express warranty cases
justify its abolition in automobile cases. This abolition will not create
interpretive difficulties in the Code and therefore abolishing privity in
express warranty cases is fully justified.
1. Remedy Limitations
Even if privity is abolished, the buyer is not home free because
some courts have limited the situations in which a buyer can revoke his
or her acceptance of the product when there is no privity of contract.
When an exclusive repair or replacement remedy fails of its essential
purpose the buyer is statutorily given all available remedies provided in
98. Perm. Ed. Bd. U.C.C. Report No. 3 at 14 (1966).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
100. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
101. Id. at 12, 181 N.E.2d at 402.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 402-03.
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the Code,1 ' including that provided in section 2-608.1°5 Once the priv-
ity requirement is abolished, all these remedies should also be available
against the manufacturer. Such is not always the case. The plaintiff
may not be allowed to revoke his or her acceptance from the manufac-
turer under section 2-608.106
Courts that refuse to allow the buyer to revoke his or her accept-
ance base their decision on the inclusion of the word "seller" in section
2-608.107 Seller is defined as a "person who sells or contracts to sell
goods."10 8 Section 2-608, however, does not say that revocation of ac-
ceptance can be taken only against the seller. It only conditions the
buyer's revocation rights on certain preconditions, °10 and it is in this
context that the word "seller" is used in section 2-608. "Seller" is used
only twice in section 2-608, first in the requirement that the buyer have
an excuse for accepting defective goods in the first place such as ac-
ceptance based on the seller's assurances.11  The second time the term
"seller" is used is in the requirement that notice of revocation of ac-
ceptance be given to the seller.1 ' Acceptance without discovery of the
104. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
105. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1978).
106. This is a desirable remedy, since many buyers do not want to keep the defective product
and seek damages based on the difference between the value of the car if it had been in the
condition. warranted and its actual value. For example, if a buyer, whose exclusive remedy has
faile-d of its essential -urpose, had a defective car that could not be fixed, he or she would be- stuck
with a defective car and damages that could not be used to repair the car. Yet, this is the measure
of damages in § 2-714 for goods the buyer keeps. Many buyers merely want to return the car to
the dealer, get their down payment back and eliminate any obligation to pay the remainder of the
purchase price. Moreover, after rejection or revocation of acceptance the buyer is still entitled to
damages under § 2-712 or § 2-713.
107. U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(b)(2) (1978). Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d
1208 (6th Cir. 1974); Seekings v. Jimmy GMC, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981); Conte
v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); Gasque v. Mooers Motor
Car Co., 227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384 (1984); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 461,
184 S.E.2d 727 (1971).
108. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d) (1978).
109. See supra note 80.
110. U.C.C. § 2-608(l)(a)-(b) (1978) states:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-
conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it has
not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably in-
duced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assur-
ances. (Emphasis added.)
111. U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (1978) states:
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change
in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective
COMMERCIAL CODE CONSTRUCTION
nonconformity due to assurances by the seller does not mandate that
the revocation of the acceptance be taken only against the seller, nor
does the requirement that notice be given to the seller require such a
result. Article 2, in general, contemplates actions between buyers and
sellers, but once a court allows any remedy against a remote party,
such as a manufacturer, there is no basis for treating revocation of ac-
ceptance as separate and distinct from a damage remedy for accepted
goods. However, this is what the courts have done since they allow the
plaintiff to sue for damages.
An examination of the remedy sections of Article 2 reveals that
there is no basis for treating a damage remedy for accepting goods
differently from a right to revoke acceptance. Unlike prior law a buyer
does not have to choose between remedies." 2 A buyer can revoke ac-
ceptance and cancel the underlying contract and still recover dam-
ages. 1 8 The type of damages a buyer can recover when rejecting or
revoking acceptance are included in sections 2-712 and 2-713,114 which
covers the buyer's right to damages when the buyer rejects the goods.
Section 2-608(3) states that when a buyer rightfully revokes accept-
ance of a product he or she has the "same rights and duties with regard
to the goods involved as if he had rejected them." '
It is in these damage sections for rejected or revoked goods that
the only evidence for limiting the revocation remedy to the seller exists.
Section 2-712 delineates the measure of damages to which the buyer is
entitled when the buyer rejects the goods and buys substitute goods.
This is the only remedy section that states that the buyer may recover
damages from the seller.116 This should not be used to justify limiting
revocation of acceptance to the seller because a buyer does not even
until the buyer notifies the seller of it. (Emphasis added.)
112. U.C.C. § 2-608 official comment 1 (1977) emphasizes that the Code drafters chose the
phrase "revocation of acceptance" instead of the old term "rescission" to make it clear that the
buyer was no longer obligated to elect between a damages remedy and revocation of acceptance.
113. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982).
114. U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713 (1978).
115. U.C.C. § 2-608(3) (1978).
116. U.C.C. § 2-712 (1978) states:
(1) After a breach within the preceeding section the buyer may "cover" by making
in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller. (Emphasis added.)
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the
cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential dam-
ages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of
the seller's breach. (Emphasis added.)




need to seek damages, let alone measure his or her damages under sec-
tion 2-712. Under section 2-713, a buyer may decide not to cover and
may merely recover damages based on the differences between the
market price of the goods and contract price. Unlike section 2-712, sec-
tion 2-713 does not state that the buyer can recover damages from the
seller. 117 If the Code drafters had wanted to limit revocation remedies
to the seller, such limiting language would be in sections 2-608 and 2-
713, not only in section 2-712.
Section 2-713 includes language about the seller's breach and
could be used to support the decisions that limit revocation of accept-
ance to the seller. However, section 2-714 has the same language link-
ing damages to the seller's breach. 1 8 Section 2-714 sets up the measure
of damages for accepted goods or goods the buyer keeps. There is no
difference in the use of the word "seller" in the sections dealing with
damage remedies for rejected and revoked goods, sections 2-712 and 2-
713, and the section delineating the damage remedies for accepted
goods, section 2-714. Thus, Code language does not justify different
treatment in allowing a buyer to sue a nonprivity manufacturer for
damages under section 2-714 but barring the buyer from revoking ac-
ceptance from such manufacturer.
If a court reads the Code literally, it should bar any type of rem-
edy from the manufacturer unless the manufacturer was also the seller.
Once a court abolishes the privity requirement with respect to dam-
ages, it should also make adjustments in other sections of Article 2,
including reading the word "seller" liberally in all the buyer's remedy
sections.11' The Code states that its remedies are to be construed liber-
ally.120 However, there is no statutory basis for distinguishing between
117. U.C.C. § 2-713 (1978) states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price
(Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller
is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller's breach. (Emphasis added.)
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejec-
tion after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
118. U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (1978) states:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of
Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any
manner which is reasonable. (Emphasis added.)
119. U.C.C. §§ 2-608, 2-711, 2-712, 2-713, 2-714 (1978).
120. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978) states:
(1) The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end
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revocation damages and acceptance damages. Thus, without liberal
construction of Code language, even though privity is abolished, the
buyer will still have no available remedy since all damage sections ad-
dress breach by the seller. 121 Moreover, the Code drafters did not in-
tend to preclude abolition of vertical privity. 22 If that was not their
intent by the language in section 2-318 alternative A, then it cannot be
argued that they intended such a result by discussing the seller's
breach in nearly all of the buyer's remedy sections.
In express warranty situations strong policy grounds exist for the
abolition of privity. Courts have recognized that a manufacturer should
not be allowed to induce the purchase of its product, either by express
statements about the product's characteristics or quality, or by ex-
pressly warranting the product, and then use privity to protect itself
from suits when the product does not have such characteristics or qual-
ity, or the expressly stated warranty is breached.12 This should be the
case even if a remedy also exists against the seller; but, as can be seen,
sellers often disclaim all warranties for themselves when an express
manufacturing warranty is available. Thus, allowing the buyer to sue
the manufacturer is the only remedy available to the buyer.
Barring a buyer from any remedy from the manufacturer based on
lack of privity is at least consistent with Article 2, especially if the
jurisdiction has adopted alternative A of section 2-318. Of the five ju-
risdictions that have held that a buyer cannot revoke acceptance of a
product from a nonprivity manufacturer, four have abolished vertical
privity at least when an express warranty is involved.124 In these juris-
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as
specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.
121. See supra notes 110, 111, 116-18.
122. U.C.C. § 2-318 official comment 3 (1978).
123. See supra text accompanying note 53.
124. In Connecticut, in Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144
(1976), the court held that a buyer could not revoke acceptance against the manufacturer. In
Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963), the court allowed a buyer to sue a
manufacturer for damages for breach of an express warranty. Applying Ohio law, the court in
Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1974), held that a buyer
could sue a manufacturer for damages despite the lack of privity but could not revoke his accept-
ance of the product. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966),
makes it clear that in Ohio a buyer can sue a manufacturer on an express warranty despite lack of
privity. In Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384 (1984), the court held
that a manufacturer could not be subject to a revocation of acceptance. In Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965) abolishes privity in warranty actions. In West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §
46-A-6-108 (Supp. 1985) abolishes privity in warranty actions. In Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales,
Inc., 155 W. Va. 461, 184 S.E.2d 727 (1971), the court held that the buyer could not revoke
acceptance against a nonprivity manufacturer.
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dictions, barring a buyer from revoking acceptance of a product from a
manufacturer is not based on lack of privity. If such a decision is not
based on privity, it must be based on the use of the word "seller" in
section 2-608. This is an inaccurate reading of the Code. If a court has
abolished vertical privity then the buyer should be able to use all of the
remedy sections in the Code, including revocation of acceptance.
At least two courts have analyzed the situation correctly.12 In
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper126 and Durfee v. Rod Baxter Im-
ports, Inc.,127 the Eighth Circuit, applying Arkansas law, and the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, respectively, held that the buyer could revoke
acceptance of the product from the manufacturer despite the lack of
privity between them. 12  In both Arkansas and Minnesota privity has
been abolished, at least for a violation of an express warranty.1 29
Neither case provides an examination of Article 2, nor does either case
address the statutory language relied on by cases ruling the other
way.180 Both courts merely emphasized that the buyer would be left
remediless if revocation of acceptance were not allowed. In Harper the
seller had gone out of business, T3 a risk that influenced the Durfee
court.1 82 Despite lack of extended reasoning, however, both decisions
are correctly decided. With the privity bar removed there is no justifi-
cation for treating revocation and damages any differently from accept-
ance and damages. Once courts recognize this, then the main problem
buyers will face is showing nonconformity when warranties have been
properly disclaimed. If there is no nonconformity then there has been
no breach and the buyer is entitled to no remedy. If there is a breach
then all remedies should be available to the buyer, including the right
125. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982); Durfee v. Rod Baxter
Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977).
126. 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982).
127. 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977).
128. 671 F.2d at 1126; 262 N.W.2d at 357-58.
129. In Arkansas, privity for both express warranty and implied warranty actions has been
abolished by statute. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.1 (Supp. 1985). A similar statute has been
enacted in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965). Arkansas' statute has been construed to
cover economic loss cases as well as cases involving property damage or personal injury. Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt and Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 437 S.W.2d 459 (1969). The statute only
provided for damages and the court in Harper had to determine whether it covered revocation of
acceptance as well. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1126. In Minnesota privity is
abolished at least as to express warranty actions. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 309 Minn.
106, 244 N.W.2d 105 (1976).
130. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982); Durfee v. Rod Baxter
Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977).
131. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d at 1126.
132. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 358.
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to revoke acceptance of the goods.
B. Implied Warranties
If the remedy path against the manufacturer for a breach of an
express warranty is a cloudy one for buyers, the remedy path for a
breach of an implied warranty is definitely harder to travel. The main
hurdle is privity. Unlike the question of privity for express warranties, a
majority of courts hold that privity is a requirement when suing on an
implied warranty.13 8 There is, however, a substantial minority that has
abolished privity even in implied warranty actions.1 ' Many of the
states that have abolished privity in implied warranty actions have done
so by statute.3
133. Best Canvas Prod. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618 (11th Cir.
1983) (interpreting Georgia law); Man v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 703 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1983) (inter-
preting Nebraska law); Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793 (D. Minn.
1980); Curtis v. Murphy Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Jenkins Brick Co. v.
Waldrop, 384 So. 2d 117 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Rocky Mountain Fire and Casualty Co. v. Bid-
dulph Oldsmobile, 131 Ariz. 289, 640 P.2d 851 (1982); Rhodrigues v. Campbell Indus., 151 Cal.
App. 3d 494, 151 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1978); G.A.F. Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Spiegel v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 897, 466 N.E.2d 1040 (1984);
Candlelight Homes, Inc. v. Zornes, 414 N.E.2d 980 (Ind. App. 1981); Professional Lens Plan,
Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 234 Kan. 742, 675 P.2d 887 (1984); Auto Owners Ins. Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 129 Mich. App. 38, 341 N.W.2d 223 (1983); Pawelec v. Digitcom, Inc., 192 N.J.
Super. 474, 471 A.2d 60 (1984); Titlebaum v. Loblaws, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 822, 407 N.Y.S.2d 307
(1978); Davis v. Siloo, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354 (1980), reh g denied, 301 N.C.
234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980); Davis v. Homasote Co., 281 Or. 383, 574 P.2d 1116 (1978) (en
banc); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assoc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124
(1976).
134. Arkansas-ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.1 (Supp. 1985); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Jet
Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 437 S.W.2d 459 (1969); Colorado-Hansen v. Mercy Hosp.,
40 Colo. App. 17, 570 P.2d 1309 (1977) afd, Bell Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 195
Colo. 529, 579 P.2d 1158 (1977) (en banc) (personal injury); Mississippi-Miss. CODE ANN. §
11-7-20 (Supp. 1984); Montana--Streich v. Hilton-Davis, 692 P.2d. 440 (Mont. 1984); Ne-
vada-Hiles Co. v. Johnston Pump Co., 93 Nev. 73, 560 P.2d 154 (1977); Ohio-A.T.S. Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 59 Ohio App. 2d 15, 391 N.E.2d 1041 (1978);
Oklahoma-Old Albomy Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979);
New Mexico-Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1983); South
Carolina-Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co., 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978); South Dakota-
Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 551 F. Supp. 771 (D. S.D. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 714 F.2d
862 (8th Cir. 1983); Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-104 (Supp. 1984) (refers to personal
injury and property damage); Commercial Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580
S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. 1979) (personal injury); Texas-Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d
77 (Tex. 1977); West Virginia-W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-108 (Supp. 1985).
135. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.1 (Supp. 1985); MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp.
1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-104 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965) (but this
section has not yet been construed to cover purely economic loss; Arkansas' statute, which is very
similar in language, has been construed to cover purely economic loss); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-108
(Supp. 1985).
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The policy reasons for justifying the elimination of the privity re-
quirement in express warranty cases are not available for abolishing the
privity requirement in implied warranty cases. In implied warranty
cases the manufacturer has done nothing to induce reliance by the
buyer on a warranty. The implied warranty is quite different from an
express contractual agreement. Although sections 2-314 and 2-315,
which contain the Code's implied warranties, are not expressly limited
to sellers, Article 2 generally contemplates a contractual relationship
between the parties. It is difficult to imagine how the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose could apply to a noncontracting party
since the warranty arises only in situations in which the buyer relies on
the other party's expertise to provide a specific product for a specific
need.136 In addition, there is no statutory authorization for abolishing
privity for implied warranties of merchantability claims, yet requiring
privity for warranties of fitness for a particular purpose claim. There-
fore, a good argument can be made that vertical privity should not be
abolished for implied warranty actions. Moreover, the abolition of ver-
tical privity in such cases creates additional problems with the lan-
guage of Article 2. The problem created by the buyer's remedy sec-
tions' reference to the seller has already been mentioned, but other
sections in Article 2 dealing with notice and the statute of limitations
will cause even more significant problems when privity is abolished.1
3 7
1. Notice to Whom?
Sections 2-607(3)(a) and 2-605(1) contain the bane of many a
plaintiff's warranty suit. They require the buyer to notify the seller of a
breach of warranty within a reasonable time after knowledge of the
breach, or the plaintiff is barred from suit.' " Section 2-607(3)(a) ap-
plies when the buyer is seeking damages for accepted goods. It merely
requires notice to the seller of a breach. Section 2-605(1) on the other
hand, applies when the buyer rejects the goods or revokes acceptance of
them. It is separate and distinct from the notice requirement in section
2-602(1) which requires the buyer to notify the seller of rejection
within a reasonable time. Section 2-605(1) requires notice of particular
136. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978) states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
137. U.C.C. §§ 2-607, 2-725 (1977).
138. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977).
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defects when the seller has a right to cure or the seller has requested
such a notice. If the buyer omits any ground for breach, he or she is
precluded from relying on such a ground to prove breach. All three of
these sections require that notice be given to the seller. The purpose of
the notice requirement is to protect the seller, allowing the seller to
cure, if time permits, under section 2-508 or otherwise minimize loss.' 3 9
If the manufacturer instead of the seller is to be sued, the notice should
be given to the manufacturer. The same is true with respect to the
notice requirement in section 2-608 when revoking acceptance. 40 To
abolish privity and yet, fail to make other adjustments in the Code,
undermines the balance created among the various sections of Article
2. Once privity is removed, all sections of Article 2 must be applied
with a view toward fulfilling their original purpose. The notification re-
quirements in sections 2-607 and 2-608 should be read to require notice
to the nonselling manufacturer.
2. Statute of Limitations--Section 2-725
Section 2-725 contains the statute of limitations applicable to sales
transactions"' and provides a basic four-year limitation period that be-
gins to accrue when the contract is breached."12 Section 2-725 could
either hurt or help the plaintiff. It could help a plaintiff since the four-
year period provided in section 2-725 is longer than the statute of limi-
tations for personal injury or property damage in most states. However,
the four-year period in section 2-725 accrues at the time of breach,
regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach,
139. U.C.C. § 2-508 (1977) allows a seller to cure a nonconforming tender when the time for
performance under the contract has not yet expired and when a buyer rejects a nonconforming
tender that the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable.
140. U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (1977) requires that revocation of acceptance be made within a rea-
sonable time after the buyer should have discovered the ground for it. Notice is required because
this section specifies that the revocation will not be considered effective until notice is given to the
seller. As in many other Code sections, the word "seller" is used. Once vertical privity is abol-
ished, however, adjustments must be made in many Code sections, of which this is just one
example.
141. U.C.C. § 2-725(1), (2) (1977) states:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of
delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance
of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the
cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
142. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1977).
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unless the warranty deals with future performance.1 43 The section spec-
ifies that in breach of warranty cases the breach occurs at the time
delivery is tendered.1 '"
When the manufacturer is being sued on a breach of implied war-
ranties, the question arises as to which tender of delivery is the relevant
date-the date of the delivery from the manufacturer to the seller, or
the date the seller delivers the product to the buyer. These two transac-
tions may be months or even years apart. Choosing the sale date from
the manufacturer is obviously to the plaintiff's disadvantage. Not only
does this starting point shorten the four-year period, but it makes the
accrual date for the statute of limitations unknown to the plaintiff
without further investigation. If the relevant sale is the sale between
the seller and the buyer, however, the manufacturer is at a disadvan-
tage. This would lengthen the four-year period since the sale from the
seller would come after the sale from the manufacturer. The manufac-
turer would not be able to estimate its liability, since it would not know
when the sale to the buyer had taken place.
The uncertainty these questions create would lead to differing in-
terpretations by the courts. This is just what section 2-725 was
designed to avoid. The official comment notes that section 2-725 was
added to Article 2 in order to provide uniformity among states and
predictability for manufacturers, especially those involved in multistate
transactions.'14 If the four-year period does not begin to run until the
sale to the ultimate buyer, the elimination of privity not only creates
uncertainty in multistate transactions but in intrastate transactions as
well.
There is an additional problem created by the language in section
2-725. The four-year period in section 2-725 is not absolute. In addition
to the future warranty exception, section 2-725 also allows the parties
to contractually agree on a shorter time period as long as the period is
at least one year. If the manufacturer is economically strong enough
to bargain the four-year period down to one year in its contract with
the seller, should this bind the buyer who was not a party to the con-
tract? Most courts would probably be inclined to hold that the buyer
ought not to be bound by such an agreement. Yet, if the buyer is not
bound and still has the four-year period in which to sue the manufac-
turer, one of the basic contractual rights given to a contracting party
143. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1977).
144. Id.
145. U.C.C. § 2-725, official comment (1977).
146. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1977).
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by statute will have been taken away by the courts.
These problems, which arise under section 2-725 once privity is
removed, have prompted many courts to hold that section 2-725 is in-
applicable when privity does not exist between the plaintiff and defend-
ant. 1 7 This eliminates the problems, and is also consistent with requir-
ing privity before any suit on implied warranties can be brought. Yet,
some jurisdictions allow a manufacturer, nonseller, to be sued for im-
plied warranty and refuse to apply section 2-725 to the statute of limi-
tations question because of the lack of privity.' " Moreover, as most
jurisdictions have abolished privity with respect to express warranties,
any decision refusing to apply section 2-725 because of lack of privity
would be equally inconsistent. This is nothing less than picking and
choosing among Code provisions to shape the law, which should not be
done. It violates basic principles of statutory construction, and the
strength of the Code. More than most other statutory compilations, the
various sections in each article in the Uniform Commercial Code are
intertwined and interrelated so that they make a whole. If any part of
Article 2 creates a cause of action, section 2-725 should apply.'14
147. Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alaska 1973); Seekings v.
Jimmy GMC, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981); Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466
A.2d 478 (Me. 1983); Southgate Community School Dist. v. Westside Constr. Co., 399 Mich. 72,
247 N.W.2d 884 (1976); McCarthy v. Bristol Lab, 86 A.D.2d 279, 449 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1982);
United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 244,
257 N.E.2d 380 (1970); Moss v. Poly Co., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974); Plouffe v. Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Co., 118 R.I. 288, 373 A.2d 492 (1977); Martin v. Patent Scaffolding, 37 Wash.
App. 37, 678 P.2d 362 (1984).
148. Ohio-United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Truck and Concrete Equip. Co., 21
Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970) (refused to apply § 2-725 unless there is privity) A.T.S.
Laboratories, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft, 59 Ohio App. 2d 15, 391 N.E.2d 1041 (1978) (allowed suit
for implied warranty despite lack of privity); Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466 A.2d 478
(Me. 1983) (refused to apply § 2-725 unless there is privity); Maine-Stanley v. Schiari Mobile
Homes, Inc., 462 A.2d 1144 (Me. 1983) (allowed suit on implied warranty despite lack of priv-
ity). Another approach is illustrated by the following cases: Becker v. Volkswagen, Inc., 52 Cal.
App. 3d 749, 125 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1975); Abate v. Barkers of Wallingford, Inc., 27 Conn. Supp.
46, 229 A.2d 366 (1967); Heavner v. Uniroyal Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) (held that
when personal injury is involved § 2-725 is inapplicable). These courts note that implied warranty
actions for personal injuries sound in tort and thus the general personal injury statute of limita-
tions is applicable.
It should be pointed out, however, that § 2-715(2)(b) specifically provides that damages for
personal injuries are recoverable as consequential damages. Moreover, § 2-719(3) makes any at-
tempt to contractually exclude personal injury damages caused by consumer goods, prima facie
unconscionable. Thus, decisions on the applicability of § 2-725 should not preclude a plaintiff from
suing for personal injuries under the warranties provided in Article 2.
149. U.C.C. § 1-104 (1977) states: "[t]his Act being a general act intended as a unified
coverage of its subject matter, no part of it shall be deemed to be impliedly repealed by subse-
quent legislation if such construction can reasonably be avoided." The official comment states:
"[t]his Act, carefully integrated and intended as a uniform codification covering an entire 'field' of
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The easiest and perhaps most fair solution to all of these problems
is to require privity in implied warranty actions and construe section 2-
725 in favor of buyers in express warranty actions when no privity is
involved. With privity required for implied warranty suits, there are no
problems in the application of section 2-725. In express warranties, the
manufacturer has taken steps on which it was reasonably foreseeable
that a buyer would rely. Under these circumstances, it is not unfair to
construe the phrase "tender of delivery" in section 2-725 as the sale
between the seller and buyer. Moreover, since the buyer is not a con-
tracting party, any reduction in the four-year period in the contract
between the manufacturer and the seller should not bind the buyer.
The manufacturer should not be allowed to make express warranties,
and yet undermine these warranties by reducing the statute of limita-
tions period. By requiring privity in implied warranty cases, the Code
can be applied consistently and fairly. When there is personal injury or
property damage the buyer would have a products liability cause of
action. Only with economic losses would the buyer be limited to reme-
dies against the seller.
Unfortunately, courts are not following this approach. A number
of courts require privity before they will apply section 2-725. This cre-
ates problems only if the same jurisdiction allows suits on the Code for
implied warranties without requiring privity. However, not all courts
require privity in applying section 2-725. Some courts apply section 2-
725 to all warranty actions, including those in which there is no priv-
ity.150 In these jurisdictions the interpretive problems with section 2-
725 will have to be resolved.
law, is to be regarded as particularly resistant to implied repeal." When courts apply some sec-
tions of the Code while refusing to apply other sections applicable to the transaction, they in
essence are impliedly repealing those sections with respect to similar cases. Moreover, § 1-102 sets
out rules of construction. Subsection 1-102(1) states that the Act is to be "construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies." U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1977). Listed as one of the
underlying purposes and policies is the goal of making uniform the law among the various juris-
dictions. This policy is again reiterated in the official comment to § 2-725. Ignoring § 2-725 or any
other section when the sale of goods is involved ignores these underlying policies and the express
statutory language.
150. Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del. 1980); Everhart v. Rich's, Inc.,
128 Ga. App. 319, 196 S.E.2d 475 (1973); Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309
N.E.2d 550 (1974) (however, an Illinois Appellate Court has required privity); Knox v. North
Am. Car Corp., 80 II1. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355 (1980) (Simon, J., concurring); Spring
Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985) (dicta); Williams v. West




The impetus behind the abolition of privity in implied warranty
actions was initially the injustice of precluding a personally injured
plaintiff from recovery from a manufacturer. Now, however, more than
twenty years after the adoption of section 402(A) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, products liability has filled the need for providing
injured plaintiffs a cause of action against the manufacturer without
privity. 1 Thus, there is no longer a need to abolish privity. Moreover,
a good statutory argument can be made against abolition of privity in
implied warranty actions.
A number of states, such as Arkansas, have statutorily abolished
vertical privity in implied warranty actions, but such legislation has
created a host of problems with other Article 2 sections. Once privity
has been abolished, the interpretive problems created must be resolved
by construing the Code as a whole based on its underlying purposes.
The rejection of a "lemon" automobile or any other good has cer-
tain potential limitations. Many of these are due to court misconstruc-
tion of Code language, primarily in section 2-608 and the right to re-
voke a buyer's acceptance of goods. Section 2-608, however, is basically
straightforward. Once a buyer has a right to revoke his or her accept-
ance of goods, section 2-608(3) gives the buyer all the rights and duties
of a person who has rejected the goods. These rights include a right to
return the goods, recover any money paid, cancel the contract under
section 2-711 and, if applicable, seek damages under either section 2-
712 or 2-713 and incidental and/or consequential damages under sec-
tion 2-715. Examined together, the Code sections make sense. Basi-
cally, the remedy sections are designed to place the aggrieved party in
as good a position as it would have been in if the other party had per-
formed.15 2 If the buyer returns the goods to the seller, damages are
measured under sections 2-712 or 2-713 and 2-715. Only if the accept-
ance cannot be revoked is the buyer relegated to keeping the goods and
seeking damages under section 2-714. The key is reading and under-
standing all of the relevant Code sections as they relate to one another.
Once this is done the rights of the buyer, as well as members of the
distributive chain can be protected.
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